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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
KIMBALL ELEVATOR COMPANY, INC., 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ELEVATOR SUPPLIES COMPANY, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 8066 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
Comes now the respondent, Kimball Elevator Co·mpany, Inc., 
a corporation, and petitions the Court for a rehearing and reargu-
ment of the above-entitled cause upon the following grounds: 
POINT I 
THAT THE COURT IN ITS DECISION ON FILE HEREIN 
HAS NOT CONSIDERED THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARRIV-
ED UPON BY THE JURY. 
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POINT II 
THAT THE COURT IN ITS DECISION HAS MADE IRRE-
CONCILABLE STATEMENTS RELATIVE TO THE ISSUES. 
POINT III 
THAT THE COURT HAS MISCONSTRUED THE FACTS 
IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE LAW AND HAS COMMITTED 
ERROR THEREBY. 
POINT IV 
THAT THROUGH ITS DECISION THE COURT WOULD 
COMMIT AN INJUSTICE. 
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that the judgment and opin-
ion of the Court be recalled and a reargument be permitted of the 
en tire case, 
ANDREW JOHN BRENNAN hereby certifies that he is 
attorney of record for the respondent and petitioner herein, and 
that in his opinion there is good cause to believe that the decision 
of the Court is erroneous, that the verdict and judgment of the 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I 
THAT THE COURT IN ITS DECISION ON FILE HEREIN 
HAS NOT CONSIDERED THE FINDINGS OF FACT AR-
RIVED UPON BY THE JURY. 
It is the position of your petitioner that this Cou~t, in its 
decision, has not accorded the respondent the right of having its 
theory of the case completely examined, nor has the Court, in the 
opinion of your petitioner, taken all of the evidence and given 
such every reasonable inference in the line most favorable to the 
plaintiff. 
It must be remembered that this case was tried to a jury of 
eight persons and that a unanimous verdict was rendered in favor 
of the plaintiff and respondent, your petitioner herein. 
In order that this petition may be fairly and openly consid-
ered and reviewed by the Court, it is respectfully suggested that 
the following instructions, as submitted by the trial court to the 
jury, should be studied. 
In the action the jury was instructed in part as follows: 
"The plaintiff says that the implied understanding was 
that they were acting as follows: When the plaintiff had 
asked the defendant for a bid, and after the defendant had 
responded with a bid, that the defendant would not compete 
with the plaintiff in any way for the original contract. 
The defendant says that there was no such understand-
ing. Defendant also says that the defendant was free to bid 
for an original contract. 
This is the first dispute for you to decide." 
(lnstr. No.5, page 120) 
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Since a verdict was accorded the plaintiff, such findings as 
here required by the trial judge in his instruction No.5, may not be 
set aside by this honorable Court in any ruling or decision unless 
it is apparent to the Court that an error at law was committed. 
Certainly the Court agrees, and in its decision on file herein 
has ruled that a contract may be made and found legally binding 
between the parties even though such a contract and agreement 
was not reduced to writing. The jury under the instruction given 
so held. 
The court further instructed: 
"If you find from the dealings of the parties generally, 
and independent of the negotiations for the Hotel Utah job, 
that an implied agreement not to compete existed between the 
plain tiff and the defendant, then you should find in favor 
of the plaintiff unless plaintiff waived that agreement. 
If you find that there was no implied general agreement, 
but that there was an implied agreement not to compete for 
the Hotel Utah job, then you should find for the plaintiff 
unless it was waived by the plaintiff or unless the plaintiff 
induced the implied agreement by a misrepresentation as 
explained hereafter." 
(lnstr. No. 6, page 124.) 
The Court went on to instruct: 
"The defendant says that plaintiff was informed that 
the defendant was making a competitive bid, and that the 
plaintiff said it was all right. 
If the contention of the defendant in this respect is true, 
then plaintiff has waived the implied agreement that the de-
fendant would not compete, if such an agreement existed, 
and in that event, plain tiff cannot recover. 
In determining whether the plaintiff acquiesced in an 
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original, competitive bid by the defendant, you will have to 
determine the intentions of the parties as they would have 
clearly appeared to ordinary prudent men in the positions 
of the parties at the time the defendant says that the plain-
tiff acquiesced." 
(Instr. No. 6-a, page 125) 
"The plaintiff has the burden to prove the implied agree-
ment hereinbefore discussed, either generally or for the Hotel 
Utah job. 
The defendant has the burden to prove that the plain-
tiff acquiesced in the defendant's giving a competitive bid 
to the Hotel Utah, and that the plaintiff induced the defen-
dant to agree not to compete by a misrepresentation, if such 
an agreement existed. 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving damages. 
(lnstr. No. 7, page 127.) 
It is respectfully submitted that although the decision of this 
honorable Court filed July 21, 1954, recognizes "that a contract 
may be made out even though there may be no express words 
formally stating it"; and although the Court further recognizes 
in its decision that Kimball had a right to exact a covenant from 
-Elevator Supplies that it would not compete, in consideration of 
an understanding that Kimball would sub-let part of the work 
to Elevator Supplies; and further that it is not only permissible 
but common practice for a wholesaler to contract not to sell to 
retail customers ..... The Court rules against the plaintiff. 
Again it is apparent that the jury found not only the exist-
ence of such a covenant, but also the violation thereof by the 
appellant, Elevator Supplies. The Court does not clarify or point 
out in its decision where the jury erred in this regard. 
It was the position of the plaintiff throughout the trial the 
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Hotel Utah knew the Kimball Elevator Company and the defen-
dant company worked together on the modernization jobs to be 
installed in Salt Lake City and also that they had together esti 
mated and planned the Hotel Utah. Not only did the written 
bid submitted by plaintiff August 16, 1950, absolutely confinn 
this but also (as mentioned in the decision on file) Mr. Connole 
told Jerry Smith of the Hotel that if the Elevator Supplies made 
a bid on the total job such a bid would be on identical equipment 
and that the Hotel Utah could use it as an estimate to see if the 
Kimball bid was in line. The jury obviously believed this to be 
a fact. This Court has adopted such facts. 
As shown by Instruction No. 7 the jury was admonished that 
defendant had the burden to prove that plaintiff acquiesced in the 
defendant's giving a competive bid to the Hotel Utah. 
There is not one iota of proof of such acquiscence on part 
of plain tiff. 
Rather - Mr. Connole testified that he called Roy C. Smith 
of Elevator Supplies. TR. 374, Line 6: 
"I told him that the Hotel Utah would like to have a 
proposal on the overall job to verify our bid and justification 
of the amount quoted in our proposal and asked him if he 
could prepare the same and he said he would." 
Later, as brought out on his cross examination, Mr. Connole 
further stated: 
"Q. And Mr. Smith told you that he was making a bid 
on the overall job did he not? 
A I believe I stated -- I asked Mr. Smith to make a 
supporting bid or estimate. 
Q You did not use the word "supporting". 
A I certainly did. It had to be a supporting bid. 
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Q You did not use the word "supporting bid" to Mr. 
Smith, did you? 
A I certain! y did. * * * * 
A I spent several evenings with Mr. Henker. 
Q You spent several evenings with Mr. Henker and 
you knew Mr. Henker was submitting a firm bid to the Ele-
vator Supplies Company on the overall job, did you not? 
A I did not. Mr. Henker was never to give them a 
firm bid. 
Q I am asking you whether you knew. I am not asking 
you to state your conclusion. 
THE COURT: He said he did not. 
Q (Mr. Reimann) Now didn't you testify that you 
told Mr. Henker it was all right to give the Elevator Supplies 
Company a bid on this job? 
A Yes I told him they were making up an engineer's 
estimate, a supporting bid and for them to give and for Mr. 
Henker who asked me -- I think in my deposition of Mr. 
Henker's he asked me if he should give my figures to Elevator 
Supplies Company and I told him yes, that I had asked for 
a supporting 'bid to verify my contract. 
Q You told Mr. Henker did you not, that it was per-
fectly all right with you to give a bid to the Elevator Supplies 
Company, didn't you? 
A Not a firm bid, an estimate bid or supporting bid." 
TR. Pages 545-546 
There is no proof of acquiescence on the part of the plain-
tiff for the defendant to make a firm bid. 
Such was the theory of the plaintiff and also the fundamental 
element of the case as submitted to the jury by the trial court. 
If there was a contract, express or implied, existing between the 
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parties, the defendant was not released therefrom by Kimball. 
Yet this Court in its decision on file herein, seems to take 
and adopt the view that the Hotel Utah could revoke and release 
Elevator Supplies through a direct request to Elevator Supplies. 
The Court states in its decision of July 21, 1954: 
"However, on the next day Hotel Utah called Elevator 
Supplies and asked for a bid on the entire job, in response 
to which defendant submitted a firm bid which was accepted. 
These facts do not indicate any acquiesence by plaintiff but 
rather a deliberate breach of contract by the defendant company. 
The fact that Hotel Utah may have requested a firm bid from 
the defendant is no proof plaintiff released defendant from its 
agreement not to bid. 
POINT II 
THAT THE COURT IN ITS DECISION HAS MADE IRRE-
CONCILABLE STATEMENTS RELATIVE TO THE ISSUES. 
In the closing remarks of this decision the Court reports: 
"The Hotel Utah indicated that it wanted another bid 
and there is no showing that it is expected or desired anything 
other than a bona fide one. ***" 
The Respondent must again point out that it makes no claim 
against the Hotel Utah, its officers or employees, and that the 
"desires" of the Hotel Utah were not at issue before the trial court 
or the jury. The Hotel Utah is not a party to this proceedings. 
It has constantly been, and it will forever be, the position of 
the Kimball Elevator Company that the Hotel Utah would have 
received identical equipment and a complete renovation of its 
machines - all at a lower cost - if the defendant had remained 
10 
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true to its contract and submitted an estimate to the Hotel rather 
than its firm quotation. 
We respectfully urge and plead for a rear gum en t of this case. 
Consider the decision of this Court filed July 21, 1954, re-
porting in its conclusion: 
"Kimball itself requested Elevator Supplies to bid and thus 
of course knew that it was being made, but neither exacted 
a promise from defendant that the bid would be excessive, 
nor advised the Hotel Utah that the bid would be anything 
other than an honest bid on the job. If such promise had been 
made, so that the Elevator Supplies was not free to make a 
truly competitive bid, it would have been highly improper 
for plaintiff to refer the Hotel Utah to Elevator Supplies 
for a bid without disclosing such fact to the Hotel Utah. 
Since no such disclosure was made, it must follow that even 
if plaintiff had established such a contract it would have been 
a fraud against the Hotel Utah and consequently unenforce-
able." 
A grave statement for a published record - wherein does the 
Court in justice make such a ruling when in the same decision 
it may report the following: 
"The Hotel Engineer, Mr. Jerry Smith, asked plaintiff's 
Mr. Connole if he had any suggestions as to other .companies 
which might desire to bid and particularly inquired if Ele-
vator Supplies would make a bid on the total job. Mr. Con-
nole stated that such a bid would be on identical equipment 
and that the Hotel Utah could use it as an estimate to see 
if the Kimball bid was in line. He then called Roy Smith, 
manager of Elevator Supplies in San Francisco, and advised 
him that the Hotel Utah would like a bid on the over-all job 
to verify the plaintiff~s price. It is plaintiff's position that 
these circumstances show that the bid was to be simply what 
it calls a 'check bid' for the purpose of getting a comparison 
on the general range of Kimall's price, but that it was not 
11 
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to be competitive to plaintiff's quotation. However, the next 
day the Hotel Utah called Elevator Supplies and asked for 
a bid on the entire job, in response to which the defendant 
submitted a firm bid, which was accepted." 
Is it not obvious that the plaintiff put the Hotel on notice 
that such a bid from the defendant could be used only as an esti-
mate? 
And again we repeat that the Hotel Utah was fully aware 
plaintiff was in fact bidding on the defendant's control system. 
Also, if the defendant was not aware of its responsibility to 
the plaintiff company why was it necessary for Roy C. Smith to 
tell Jerry Smith that before he could fulfill the direct request from 
the Hotel he would have to check with his home office in New 
Jersey? Certainly Roy C. Smith made no statement of the neces-
sity of such clearance to Mr. Connole when Mr. Connole asked 
for an estimate on the entire job. 
Elevator Supplies Company has never been an independent 
contractor in this area. It has never been considered a competi-
tor by the plaintiff and certainly was not held in the position of 
competition. The record substantiates the fact that these two 
companies closely associated their efforts in the securing of a job. 
That is the reason Roy C. Smith did not have any idea of mak-
ing a competitive bid until he was directly contacted and requested 
so to do by the Hotel. He had to clear with the home office. 
Roy C. Smith did not advise Mr. Connole or any representative 
of Kimball that he intended to make a firm and competitive bid. 
Not only did the defendant mislead plaintiff in this regard, 
but on the same day it made its bid to the Hotel, it submitted its 
proposal on the same job to the plaintiff corporation. 
This Court adopts as the basis of its decision the failure of 
the Elevator Supplies to directly and expressly promise plaintiff 
12 
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it would not bid competitively. We respectfully challenge such a 
finding in opposition to the cone! us ion of the jury who had oppor-
tunity to peruse the documentary evidence and to observe the 
demeanor and credibility of the witnesses. 
The jury found such a covenant to be implied in fact and 
also that defendant was not released from this covenant. 
POINT III 
THE COURT HAS MISCONSTRUED THE FACTS IN 
ITS APPLICATION OF THE LAW AND HAS COMMITTED 
ERROR THEREBY. 
The Court in its decision has adopted the theory that in the 
instance of the Hotel Utah it became incumbent upon the plain-
tiff to prove by express oral or written agreement that Elevator 
Supplies made a direct promise not to submit a competitive bid. 
(We have heretofore shown that such theory is contra to 
the outline of the issues as submitted to the jury.) 
However, if this Honorable Court is to hold to this position 
we respectfully urge a reconsideration of the facts concerning the 
statements of Charles M. Henker. 
The testimony, by stipulation was taken through deposi-
tion. It was clearly understood that such testimony was not taken 
for purposes of discovery but rather for presentation to the trial 
court and jury. 
The portion of the record of such, as presented, which this 
Court in its decision of July 21, 1954, has held to be error (on the 
authority of a case not in point) reads as follows: 
"Q Prior to your visit to Salt Lake, which you have 
just mentioned, Mr. Henker, did you have any conversation 
13 
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with Mr. Roy Smith, of the Elevator Supplies Company, 
as to the Hotel Utah job? 
A Yes. 
MR. REIMANN: Just a moment, where you skip you had 
better have it noted. If this will go to the Supreme Court, you 
read the whole works. 
THE COURT: You had better dictate to the reporter 
where you skipped question. 
MR. REIMANN: He skipped from lines 14 to 21, on 
page 17. 
MR. BRENNAN: Q Where did those conversations 
take place? 
A In San Francisco, and probably over the phone. I 
don't recall that we went to each other's office particularly. 
Q Could you tell us the date of such conversation? 
A I am only basing the date on our first bid that we 
tendered to Elevator Supplies Company, which was Septem-
ber 7th, and the whole thing took place, I would say, within 
thirty days prior to that date. 
Q Thirty days prior to September 7? 
A Right. 
Q And could you tell the court and counsel, and the 
jury, as well as you can remember, the conversation, just 
e.xactly what was said between you and Mr. Smith? 
A Well, at this time, of course, it is pretty hard to tell 
tha.t far back any exact wording of conversations. All you 
know is your impression and the things that you must have 
said in order to put up such a bid. 
Q We want you to tell us, Mr. Henker, just as well as 
you can remember, what was said between you. 
A Well, I was probably asked by Roy Smith if I would 
consider presenting a bid from Pacific Elevator and Equip-
ment Company for this part of the work, which would include, 
14 
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well, all the work previously tendered to Kimball Elevator 
Company, and our own, and on an installed basis, which 
was quite a great deal more to Pacific Elevator and Equip-
ment Company than had previously been in the Kimball bid. 
Q What was said between you when this took place? 
A When that took place I said, 'Well, it will be per-
fectly all right with Pacific Elevator and Equipment Com-
pany, if it is all right with Kimball Elevator Company, to 
go ahead on that basis.' After all, we had a bid already in 
to Kimball and it was the most natural thing for us to say, 
'if it is okay with Kimball Elevator Company, it will be all 
right'. I think we talked about ·it with the idea that they 
wanted two bids. In other words, they only had one bid and 
they wanted two bids, which would let them know about 
where they stood, I imagine, with their first bid. 
Q Did they let the Hotel Utah know where they stood? 
A Yes. That is a normal procedure of buyers of that 
type. Of course, that is what necessitated the trip for Roy 
and I, going up there and making the survey that we did. 
MR. REIMANN: You can eliminate the objection to 
the next question. 
MR. BRENNAN: Q Now, if we understand you cor-
rectly, you told Mr. Smith, of Elevator Supplies Company, 
that you would not make such a quotation to Elevator Sup-
plies without a clearance from Kimball? 
A That is correct. 
Q What did Mr. Smith say to you when you told him 
that? 
A The best I can recall, Roy had the same impression 
that that was a bid, a check bid, and naturally it was going 
to be higher, being done out of San Francisco both by our-
selves and themselves. I think the feeling was mutual be-
tween us, at least it was my impression that the bid would 
be so much higher that there would be nothing to it; that 
IS 
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the contract would automatically go to Kimball Elevator 
Company. 
MR. REIMANN: I moved to strike the answer on the 
ground it was not responsive. I would like the Court to ex-
amine that. 
MR. BRENNAN: He hasn't answered yet. How could 
you move to strike? I asked him what Mr. Smith said when 
he told him he would not bid, -- he would not make a quota-
tion to Elevator Supplies without a clearing from Kimball and 
this is the same conversation. 
MR. REIMANN: He did not answer the question, and 
gave his impression and interpretation rather than what was 
said. He said in the beginning, You Honor ---
THE' COURT: Let me read it. I cannot look at you 
and read it too. 
The objection is overruled. 
MR. BRENNAN: Q What did Mr. Smith say to you 
when you told him that? 
A The best I can recall, Roy had the same impression 
that that was a bid, a check bid, and naturally it was going 
to be higher, being done out of San Francisco both by our-
selves and themselves. I think the feeling was mutual be-
tween us, at least it was my impression that the bid would 
be so much higher that there would be nothing to it; that 
the contract would automatically go to Kimball Elevator 
Company. 
MR. REIMANN: I move to strike the answer on the 
grounds the witness gives his impressions rather than what 
is a fact. 
THE COURT: The motion is denied. 
MR. REIMANN: Now I want to make a separate motion 
to strike "Roy had the same impression that that was a bid, 
a check bid, and naturally it was going to be higher, being 
done out of San Francisco both by ourselves and themselves". 
16 
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THE COURT: Without subsequent material, I think 
your objection would be well taken. In view of what I read 
in the next question, the motion is denied. 
MR. BRENNAN: Now may I ---
MR. REIMANN: I want to make a separate objection, 
and move to strike the statement, "I think the feeling was 
mutual between us" in other words, the balance of the sen-
tence, on the ground it is a conclusion of the witness and 
is not a statement of fact at all, lines 3 and 4. 
THE COURT: The motion is denied. 
MR. BRENNAN: May the record show we are proced-
ing, at line 8, page 20 with this question, Q You are refer-
ring, Mr. Henker, to what was said between you and Mr. 
Smith? 
A That is correct. After all this time all you can give 
is impressions. No man remembers what was said at this 
time. I may put it this way: It was definitely discussed 
on those terms. That is beyond the point of impression. 
I am trying to point out to you that I am not going to be 
able to tell you word for word what was said. That is out of 
the question. 
The foregoing testimony, based upon Reese vs. Morgan Sil-
ver Mining Company, 17 Utah 489, 54P. 759 was ruled upon as 
being in error. In the Reese Case one of the questions for the 
jury was whether or not deceased had been guilty of contributory 
negligences after having used a defective and rotten ladder in 
a mine shaft, the Utah Court noted: 
"It was agreed that F. S. Snyder, a witness for the de-
fendant, if present, would testify subject to all legal objec-
tions, as follows: Deceased understood perfect! y the ground 
we were working, the nature of the incline and the character 
of the ladder. The court on motion struck out this testi-
mony as being a conclusion of the witness and not a state-
ment of fact within his knowledge." 
17 
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Let it be noted Henker stated positively and unequivocally: 
"It was definitely discussed on those terms. That is 
beyond the point of impression. I am trying to point out 
to you that I am not going to be able to tell you word for 
word what was said. That is out of the question." 
Since Mr. Henker could not remember word for word what 
was said, his recount of the discussion was not the most accurate 
method of translating the incidents to the court and jury. This 
method is sound, common sense practice and good law. 
See Wigmore on Evidence Third Ed. Vol. VII, Page 466, Par. 
2049. This learned author at Par. 2049, Sub par. II ( 4), page 473 
sums up his treatise as follows: 
" ( 4) Finally, the rules must often, by practical neces-
sity, be different for oral and for written utterances. The 
former lie in memory only, and overmuch cannot be deman-
ded in the reproduction of words by mere memory. The 
latter may be copied literally and entirely, or may be pro-
duced in specie. Hence, less strictness may be shown in apply-
ing the principle to the former class of utterances." 
Observe Wigmore Third Ed. Vol. VII, par. 2097. 
"Complete certainly as to an utterance's true meaning 
can be ascertained only by considering every word in it. The 
change, omission, or addition of even a single word may 
radically alter the meaning. But for oral utterances such 
verbal precision need not and cannot be required. It need 
not be, for the importance of single words in oral discourse 
is comparatively much less than in writings; and it cannot 
'be, since memory does not retain precise words, except of 
simple utterances and for a short time. 
Hence, verbal precision is in general not required in 
proving oral utterances; the substance or effect is sufficient: 
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'It can rarely happen that a witness who was present 
when a conversation was had between two individuals can 
at any time afterwards, and particularly at any distant time, 
state precisely what was said by them, althouqh he may re-
collect distinctly an agreement made between them at the time. 
If then, in all cases the witness is required to state what was 
said so accurately that the jury may be enabled to judge by the 
terms used what a contract was, it must frequently happen 
that a contract not in writing cannot be proved at all. .... 
The recollection of a witness as to what an agreement be-
tween parties was, according to his understanding of what 
was said by them at the time, may be very satisfactory evi-
dence, although he may not be able to recollect distinctly 
one word that was said .... The credit that may be due to 
a witness in these cases may depend much on his being able 
to detail enough of the conversation to show that his under-
standing of the matter was probably right. But what he 
understood is in all cases evidence to be weighed by the jury.' 
* * * * The general rule, universally accepted, is therefore 
that the substance or effect of the actual words spoken will 
suffice, the witness stating this substance as best he can from 
the impression left upon his memory. He may give his 'under-
standing, or 'impression' as to the net meaning of the words 
heard." 
We respectfully submit that the trial court did not err and 
the jury was entitled to consider the testimony of Charles Henker 
concerning the type of bid Elevator Supplies was to make to the 
Hotel Utah. 
POINT IV 
THAT THROUGH ITS DECISION THE COURT WOULD 
COMMIT AN INJUSTICE. 
The undisputed facts are contrary to the decision of July 
21, of this Court and through the reversal of the judgment and the 
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verdict of the jury, this court would commit a dire injustice, in that 
the plaintiff would not only lose a contractual right, but also be 
held as a party to a colusive agreement. 
The plaintiff, contrary to the decision of the Court on file 
JulY 21, 1954, did not recommend or propose that a bid be made 
by its supplier, Elevator Supplies. 
Again the undisputed facts are that Mr. Jerry Smith, of the 
Hotel Utah, inquired of this, and was told by Mr. Connole that 
Elevator Supplies would have to quote upon the same equipment 
and that any bid from them could be considered only as an estimate. 
The law is clearly settled that unless it clearly appear a con-
tract conflicts with public policy, the court is not justified in mak-
ing such a conclusion. See Palmer vs. Chamberlain 191 F 2d 
532,27 A.L.R. 2d 416, wherein the court ruled: 
"When the court is asked to declare a contract void on 
the ground that it conflicts with policy, to justify sustaining 
the defense, the line of policy must be clear and distinct. 
Bank of Augusta vs. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 597, 10 L.Ed. 274. 
This is upon the reasoning that men shall have the utmost 
liberty of contracting and that their agreements, when entered 
into fairly and voluntarily shall be held sacred and enforced 
by the courts. This freedom of contract is not to be lightly 
interfered with. The burden of showing illegality is upon 
the party asserting it and it is not sufficient to create con· 
fusion and suggest doubts as to its legality. Illinois Surety 
Co. vs. O'Brien 6 Cir. 2237 F. 933." 
See also 12 Am. Jur. 744, holding that there is a presumption of 
the legality of contracts and that were the terms of an agreement 
are disputed, the Court may not find facts making the contract 
contrary to public policy, but must follow the findings of the 
jury or of the trial court, in order to conclude or make a presum-
tion on such disputed facts. 
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It has constantly been the position of the plaintiff that if 
the defendant corporation had lived up to the convenants existing 
between them, the Hotel Utah would have profited by such an 
agreement. In other words, the Hotel Utah, through a word from 
representatives of the defendant corporation could have been 
assured that the bid of the plaintiff at less than $60,000.00 was 
fair and reasonable. The plaintiff adequately showed in the 
trial of the cause, that this contract price of less than $60,000.00 
would not only cover the job, but also afford the plaintiff a modest 
profit. 
Considering the plaintiff's theory of this case, which the 
jury unanimously held to be the truth, justice and fair dealing are 
sponsored, but if the decision of July 21, is not reconsidered, it is 
the considered and honest belief of counsel for your petitioner 
that this court sanctions breach of contract, unfair dealing and 
dishonesty. 
It has been held quite unanimously by the authorities, were 
a contract is capable of construction in accordance with justice 
and fair dealing, the court will adopt such contruction instead of 
a construction which shall entail loss to a party on the contract. 
See 17 C.J.S. Contracts 319 pages 739-740, also U.S. vs. South-
ern Gulf Lumber Company 106 Fed Sup. 815. 
The Kimball Elevator Company was certainly justified in 
protecting its own business interest so long as the rights of the 
Hotel Utah were not thereby jeopardized and so long as the Hotel 
was not either preyed upon or misled. 
See 17 C.J.S. 549, Contracts 197, wherein it is stated: 
"**** An agreement having the effect of restricting 
bidding may be legal where it is made to protect the rights 
of the parties and to advance their interests and there is no 
purpose to injure or defraud others interested in the result 
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of the sale or contract award." Note 31, citing: Wilder vs. 
Noble et ux, 79 P .2d 682, 195 Wash. 1. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the facts of this case and the law uphold the verdict 
of the jury and the judgment of the trial court, it is respectfully 
and earnestly petitioned that this Honorable Court reconsider its 
decision of July 21, 1954 and grant a rehearing and reargument 
of the case, and that upon such review it uphold the position 
of the plaintiff, which is the position of right and justice. 
Respectifully submitted. 
ANDREW JOHN BRENNAN 
Attorney for Respondent and Petitioner 
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